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THE DIVIDED EXECUTIVE 
LAURENCE CLAUS* 
Article II’s apparent provision for a unitary executive is at odds 
with a mature understanding of what makes the separation of powers 
constitutionally valuable. From Montesquieu to Brandeis, jurists 
theorizing separation of powers have characterized its purpose as 
primarily to promote liberty and the rule of law. Two centuries of 
constitutional experience lets us now see more clearly that liberty and 
the rule of law are promoted by checks and balances that prevent 
individual actors, including the President, from conclusively 
determining the reach of their own powers. Dividing the executive 
may further promote the liberty and rule-of-law goals of the 
Constitution’s existing checks and balances. This article, written for a 
symposium at Duke University School of Law entitled An Even More 
Perfect Union: Proposed Amendments to the Constitution, further 
develops and deepens the case made in existing scholarship for 
dividing the American national executive, and in particular for 
constitutionally securing the independence of the Attorney General. 
I. THE TEXT OF THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT 
1. The President of the United States shall nominate and, with the 
advice and consent of the Senate, appoint, an Attorney General of 
the United States. The Senate shall vote directly on the question 
whether to consent to the President’s nominee within 30 days of 
nomination and no Senate rule may prevent resolution of the 
question by simple majority. The President’s nominee shall serve as 
Acting Attorney General until the Senate vote. If the Senate does 
not consent to the President’s nominee, the President shall 
withdraw the nomination and nominate another candidate in each 
30-day period until such a nomination receives Senate consent. 
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2. The Attorney General of the United States shall have exclusive 
power to prosecute crimes and misdemeanours under the laws of 
the United States and to act on behalf of the United States in 
other judicial proceedings, including power to delegate that 
discretion to subordinates. Congress may invest the Attorney 
General with oversight of investigative agencies that fulfill 
functions preliminary or ancillary to prosecutions or other judicial 
proceedings. 
3. The Attorney General of the United States shall be removable 
only for good cause by two thirds vote of each House of Congress. 
The Attorney General’s term of office shall otherwise be 
coextensive with that of the nominating President. 
4. Subordinates of the Attorney General of the United States shall 
be removable only by impeachment and conviction in accordance 
with Article II, Section 4 or by the Attorney General of the United 
States. For removal of inferior officers, the Attorney General may 
delegate his removal power. 
II. INTRODUCTION: THE ATTORNEY GENERAL IN THE NATIONAL 
EXECUTIVE 
When scholars discuss distributing the executive power of 
governing among multiple actors,1 separating one particular executive 
office comes regularly to the fore: the Attorney General.2 An English 
 
 1.  See, e.g., Daniel B. Rodriguez, State Constitutional Failure, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1243 
(2011); Jacob E. Gersen, Unbundled Powers, 96 VA. L. REV. 301 (2010); Vikram David Amar, 
Lessons from California’s Recent Experience with Its Non-Unitary (Divided) Executive: Of 
Mayors, Governors, Controllers, and Attorneys General, 59 EMORY L.J. 469 (2009); Steven G. 
Calabresi & Nicholas Terrell, The Fatally Flawed Theory of the Unbundled Executive, 93 MINN. 
L. REV. 1696 (2009); Christopher R. Berry & Jacob E. Gersen, The Unbundled Executive, 75 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1385 (2008); Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, Commentary, The President: 
Lightning Rod or King?, 115 YALE L.J. 2611 (2006); Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of 
Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314 (2006); 
Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725 (1996); Lawrence Lessig & 
Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1994); Steven G. 
Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 
541 (1994); E. Donald Elliott, Why Our Separation of Powers Jurisprudence Is So Abysmal, 57 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 506 (1989); Morton Rosenberg, Congress’s Prerogative over Agencies and 
Agency Decisionmakers: The Rise and Demise of the Reagan Administration’s Theory of the 
Unitary Executive, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 627 (1989). 
 2.  See, e.g., William R. Dailey, Who Is the Attorney General’s Client?, 87 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1113 (2012); Fran Quigley, Torture, Impunity, and the Need for Independent Prosecutorial 
Oversight of the Executive Branch, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 271 (2010); Norman W. 
Spaulding, Professional Independence in the Office of the Attorney General, 60 STAN. L. REV. 
1931 (2008); William P. Marshall, Break Up the Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys General, 
and Lessons from the Divided Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 2446 (2006); Saikrishna Prakash, The 
Chief Prosecutor, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 521 (2005); Susan Low Bloch, The Early Role of the 
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import, at the time of the American Founding, the office had already 
been recognized in England to entail a degree of distance from other 
participants in executive government.3 Charles Pratt (later Lord 
Camden), who became England’s Attorney General in 1757, observed 
that he felt himself responsible, in the office of Attorney General, 
to the public as well as to the Ministers, and that he never 
prosecuted, or countermanded prosecution, or signed a warrant, if 
it was not the act of his own advice and judgment, by which he was 
ready and willing to abide, instead of throwing it off, and shifting it 
upon the Government; that he interposed himself as a judicial 
officer between the executive Government and the subject; that he 
acted as a kind of referee, accountable to both parties, by a tacit 
compact, for a sound and virtuous exercise of discretion . . . .4 
Pratt’s characterization of the office as an adjunct to the judiciary 
rather than a fully integrated element of the executive was echoed in 
the draft Judiciary Bill introduced in the United States Senate on June 
12, 1789.5 The bill provided for the Supreme Court to appoint “a meet 
person learned in the law to act as Attorney General for the United 
States,” whose duties would be to prosecute on behalf of the United 
States and to advise the President and the heads of departments on 
questions of law.6 The bill that passed the Senate and went to the 
House of Representatives omitted the provision for Supreme Court 
appointment.7 Though we have no record of the debate that led to the 
 
Attorney General in Our Constitutional Scheme: In the Beginning There Was Pragmatism, 1989 
DUKE L.J. 561 (1989); William B. Gwyn, The Indeterminacy of the Separation of Powers and the 
Federal Courts, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 474 (1989); Harold J. Krent, Executive Control over 
Criminal Law Enforcement: Some Lessons from History, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 275 (1989); Note, 
Appointing State Attorneys General: Evaluating the Unbundled State Executive, 127 HARV. L. 
REV. 973 (2014). 
 3.  Cf. Bloch, supra note 2, at 607 n.155 (“In the course of his reasoning, [Justice] Iredell 
also noted that the Attorney General in England is the responsible Law Officer of the Crown 
who needed no special order from the Crown to represent the Crown . . . .”). 
 4.  5 JOHN CAMPBELL, LIVES OF THE LORD CHANCELLORS AND KEEPERS OF THE 
GREAT SEAL OF ENGLAND 356 (3d. ed., London, John Murray 1848–50). On one occasion Pratt 
refused to follow an instruction from the Board of Treasury to desist from a prosecution. 
He took the opportunity of reminding them, with spirit and with dignity, that he was 
answerable to the public, as well as to his conscience, for the due execution of a 
judicial trust imposed upon him by his patent. The Board, at first enraged, had the 
good sense and the manliness, after cool reflection, to confess themselves in the 
wrong, and to reclaim the letter, so that it should not appear against them. 
Id. at 357. 
 5.  See Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. 
L. REV. 49, 108–09 (1923). 
 6.  Id. at 109. 
 7.  See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92–93. 
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change, Susan Low Bloch has identified correspondence that points to 
a reason for it.8 “Robert R. Livingston, in a letter thought to have 
been addressed to [Oliver] Ellsworth, complimented the draft but 
wondered, inter alia, whether it ‘would not be better that the Attorney 
General be appointed by the executive to which department he 
necessarily belongs than to the judicial . . . ?’”9 
Characterizing the office as executive did not dispel the 
established sense that an Attorney General should exercise 
independent judgment in discharging her duties. American state 
constitutional experience evidences this. The Attorney General’s 
independence is expressly entrenched in the constitutions of almost 
all American state governments.10 In 43 states, the Attorney General is 
separately elected;11 in one the Attorney General is chosen by the 
legislature;12 in one the Attorney General is chosen by the Supreme 
Court;13 and in the five where the Governor appoints the Attorney 
General,14 only two give the Governor unfettered power to dismiss 
the Attorney General.15 
Despite this history and experience, the United States 
Constitution’s vesting of “[t]he executive Power” in a President of the 
United States,16 who is expressly empowered to appoint “Officers of 
the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise 
provided for,”17 has been understood to let the President dismiss the 
Attorney General at will.18 Congress’s ability to constrain the 
President’s dismissal power has itself been held to be quite 
 
 8.  Bloch, supra note 2, at 571 n.32. 
 9.  Id. (quoting a June 24, 1789 letter from Robert R. Livingston). 
 10.  COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 226 (2017). 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  ALASKA CONST. art. III, § 25; WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 9-1-202, 9-1-601 (2017). 
 16.  U.S. CONST. art. II, §1, cl. 1. 
 17.  U.S. CONST. art. II, §2, cl. 2. 
 18.  Cf. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 1, at 598 (“We thus reject the idea that the 
President lacks a textually explicit power of removal, adopting instead the argument that the 
President may remove executive officers using his Vesting Clause grant of ‘executive Power.’”); 
Prakash, supra note 2, at 564 (“Despite the lack of the executive tag . . . the president and his 
immediate subordinates regarded [the official attorneys and the attorney general] as executive 
officers.”). But cf. Bloch, supra note 2, at 580 (“The most likely explanation for Congress’s 
failure to specify the removal of an Attorney General was that Congress was simply less sure 
about and less concerned with his removability.”); Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 18 n.74 
(“[I]t is not at all clear that the framers believed they were vesting in the President removal 
authority over the Attorney General.”). 
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constrained,19 notwithstanding the Senate’s veto over presidential 
appointments.20 In the wake of President Nixon’s dismissal of his 
Attorney General during the Watergate imbroglio, the next elected 
President sought legal advice about insulating the Attorney General 
from peremptory presidential removal.21 The advice of the 
Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) was “that 
legislation establishing a definite term of office for the Attorney 
General and restricting the President’s power to remove him only for 
cause probably would be held unconstitutional.”22 OLC reasoned that 
“the President must have control over the country’s chief law 
enforcement official because of the President’s constitutional duty 
faithfully to execute the Nation’s laws. Having reached this 
conclusion, it follows that there is no method, short of a constitutional 
amendment, to separate the Attorney General from Presidential 
control.”23 
In support of its conclusion, OLC quoted from the Supreme 
Court’s Myers decision: 
Then there may be duties of a quasi-judicial character imposed on 
executive officers . . . , the discharge of which the President cannot 
in a particular case properly influence or control. But even in such 
a case he may consider the decision after its rendition as a reason 
for removing the officer, on the ground that the discretion 
regularly entrusted to that officer by statute has not been on the 
whole intelligently or wisely exercised. Otherwise he does not 
discharge his own constitutional duty of seeing that the laws be 
faithfully executed.24 
The Myers Court’s reference to dismissal “on the ground that the 
discretion regularly entrusted to that officer by statute has not been 
 
 19.  See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 496–98 
(2010) (holding that Congress’s insulation of Board members from Presidential control through 
two layers of tenure protection, whereby Board members could be removed only by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission for good cause, and the Commissioners could in turn be 
removed by the President only for good cause, violated the Constitution ); Myers v. United 
States, 272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926) (holding invalid Congress’s attempt to restrict the President’s 
removal power over first-class postmasters with a requirement of Senate consent). But see 
Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935) (holding that Congress could restrict 
the President’s removal power over officers such as the Federal Trade Commissioners, whose 
roles the Court characterized as legislative and judicial rather than executive, by limiting the 
grounds on which those officers could be removed). 
 20.  U.S. CONST. art. II, §2, cl. 2. 
 21.  Marshall, supra note 2, at 2471. 
 22.  Proposals Regarding an Independent Attorney General, 1 Op. O.L.C. 75, 77 (1977). 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. (quoting Myers, 272 U.S. at 135). 
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on the whole intelligently or wisely exercised” exposes the tension 
between concluding that an official should exercise independent 
judgment in doing her job and that she should be subject to dismissal 
at will.25 When the Myers Court sought to justify the President’s 
dismissal power, the Court posited a good cause for dismissal, namely, 
the dismissed officer’s unintelligent or unwise use of discretion.26 That 
example would have supported a presidential power to dismiss for 
cause, but how did it support a power to dismiss at will, that is, even 
without cause? Dismissal for overall poor performance could be 
sustained on judicial review under a “good cause” standard if there 
were evidence to support it and no evidence of improper motive. To 
claim that certain officials should exercise independent judgment yet 
should be subject to dismissal at will by the chief executive is to sound 
like someone living in seventeenth century England, when and where 
even judges served at royal pleasure.27 The great reform achieved by 
the Act of Settlement of 1701 was to guarantee judicial tenure during 
good behavior.28 Good behavior tenure for judges became recognized 
in the eighteenth century as a momentous constitutional advance, and 
was appropriated by the American Founders,29 precisely because it 
helps its recipients behave independently.30 
If exercising independent judgment matters to good governance, 
then constitutional designers should introduce constitutional 
protections for the exercise of that judgment to help keep it 
independent. Taking care that the laws are faithfully executed no 
more requires an unlimited presidential power to dismiss the 
Attorney General than it requires an unlimited presidential power to 
dismiss judges, whose decisions are just as integral to the law’s faithful 
execution.31 This contribution to the symposium argues that having an 
 
 25.  Myers, 272 U.S. at 135. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Cf. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *260 (praising modern changes “to 
remove all judicial power out of the hands of the king’s privy council,” who were previously 
“inclined to pronounce that for law, which was most agreeable to the prince”). 
 28.  See id. at *258 (describing good behavior tenure as helping to “maintain both the 
dignity and the independence of the judges in the superior courts”). Cf. Constitutional Reform 
Act, 2005, c. 4, § 33 (UK) (“A judge of the Supreme Court holds that office during good 
behaviour, but may be removed from it on the address of both Houses of Parliament.”). 
 29.  U.S. CONST. art. III, §1. 
 30.  Cf. ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON: 
VOL. 1 365 (Carson Hollway & Bradford P. Wilson eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2017) (1788) 
(“[T]he judicial [authority] is still reserved for an independent body, who hold their office 
during good behavior.”). 
 31.  See Prakash, supra note 2, at 568 (“[A]t one time the broad category of law execution 
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Attorney General whose independent judgment is constitutionally 
protected matters to good governance as surely as having courts 
whose independent judgment is constitutionally protected. 
This article examines the theoretical foundations of the American 
Founders’ choice to write Article II of the Constitution as they did. 
We will explore the support for their choice supplied by 
Montesquieu’s seminal account of power separation. Accepting for 
purposes of the argument that the current Article II contemplates an 
executive that is sufficiently unitary to subject the Attorney General 
to presidential control, this article elaborates a case for concluding 
that the constitutionally valuable principle behind the separation of 
powers may be vindicated and advanced, not compromised and 
diminished, by dividing the executive, and that it certainly would be 
advanced by a well crafted separation of the Attorney General from 
the rest of the executive. 
III. MONTESQUIEU AND THE FOUNDING VISION OF SEPARATED 
POWERS 
In presenting and arguing for the Philadelphia Convention’s draft 
constitution during the ratification debates, James Madison observed 
of the document’s tripartite power distribution: “The oracle who is 
always consulted and cited on this subject is the celebrated 
Montesquieu. If he be not the author of this invaluable precept in the 
science of politics, he has the merit at least of displaying and 
recommending it most effectually to the attention of mankind.”32 
Emphasizing that Montesquieu’s famous account was a purported 
description of the English constitution, Madison contended that 
Montesquieu 
did not mean that these departments ought to have no partial 
agency in, or no control over the acts of each other. His meaning, 
as his own words import, and still more conclusively as illustrated 
by the example in his eye [namely, England], can amount to no 
more than this, that where the whole power of one department is 
exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of 
 
generally encompassed both prosecution and judging. But by 1789, even though judging was still 
part of the overall task of law execution, Americans viewed judging, in part, as a check on the 
executive’s law enforcement. This was a legacy of English law, and it was reinforced by 
Montesquieu’s maxim.”). 
 32.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison), in 15 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF 
THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 499 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds. 2009), 
http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/RNCN-03-15-02-0136. 
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another department, the fundamental principles of a free 
constitution, are subverted.33 
Three features of the picture emerging from Madison’s reading of 
Montesquieu are crucial for present purposes. First, the distinctive 
virtue of power separation was that it promoted what Montesquieu 
called “political liberty,” to which Madison adverted in his reference 
to the “principles of a free constitution.”34 In The Spirit of the Laws, 
Montesquieu’s abstract account of the system of government that he 
had witnessed on his long visit to England35 appeared in a chapter 
entitled “Of the Constitution of England” and asserted that the 
“direct end” of that constitution was, uniquely, “political liberty.” 
What did such liberty entail? A freedom from the fear that power will 
be abused.36 “The political liberty of the subject,” said Montesquieu, 
“is a tranquility of mind arising from the opinion each person has of 
his safety. In order to have this liberty, it is requisite the government 
be so constituted as one man needs not be afraid of another.”37 Justice 
Louis Brandeis reprised that characterization of separation’s 
structural purpose when arguing in his Myers dissent that Congress 
should be able to add checks to the President’s power to dismiss 
officials: “The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by 
the Convention of 1787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude the 
exercise of arbitrary power.”38 
Second, Montesquieu understood the structural accomplishment 
of the English constitution to be a separation of essentially 
distinguishable kinds of power.39 Madison seemed to share this 
understanding. He proposed to the first Congress that among the 
amendments that would become the bill of rights there should be a 
provision that 
 
 33.  Id. at 500. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  His account was focused on the legal system that operated in England, which differed 
in some relevant respects from that of Scotland, with which a political union had been more 
fully achieved not long before Montesquieu’s visit. For example, Montesquieu’s account of the 
separated “power of judging” made clear that he was focused on the jury system as he had 
observed it in England. See 1 CHARLES-LOUIS DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE 
SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, bk. 11, ch. 6, 175–76 (Thomas Nugent trans., rev’d ed., Cincinnati, R. 
Clark & Co. 1873) (1748); see also id. bk. 6 ch. 3, 85–86. 
 36.  Id. at bk. 11, ch. 5, 173–74; see also id. at bk. 11, ch. 6, 185. 
 37.  Id. at bk. 11, ch. 5, 174. 
 38.  Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 39.  MONTESQUIEU, supra note 35, at bk. 11, ch. 6. 
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[t]he powers delegated by this constitution, are appropriated to the 
departments to which they are respectively distributed: so that the 
legislative department shall never exercise the powers vested in 
the executive or judicial; nor the executive exercise the powers 
vested in the legislative or judicial; nor the judicial exercise the 
powers vested in the legislative or executive departments.40 
This resembled the famous “government of laws and not of men” 
article of the Massachusetts state constitution.41 It was not quite so 
emphatically essentialist as its state-level precursor, but would have 
been hard to read in some non-essentialist, institutional way, because 
the Constitution’s three great institutional establishments in Articles 
I, II, and III each opened in essentialist terms. Congress was given 
“[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted,” the President was given 
“[t]he executive Power,” and the federal courts were given “[t]he 
judicial Power.” Yet the variation in Madison’s proposed amendment 
from the Massachusetts language perhaps reflected reflection on the 
Constitution’s extensive provision for inter-branch checks and 
balances. 
Third, Montesquieu acknowledged checks and balances among 
the separated institutions of English government, by which those 
institutions were actually involved in the exercise of each other’s 
powers.42 But he saw this checking and balancing as serving the 
limited purpose of protecting the primary separation.43 He considered 
that primary separation to be necessary to preserve political liberty. If, 
for example, the executive power were “committed to a certain 
number of persons selected from the legislative body,” Montesquieu 
predicted “there would be an end then of liberty.”44 
 
 40.  12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 202 (William T. Hutchinson et al. eds., Univ. of 
Va. Press 1979); see 1 THOMAS LLOYD, THE CONGRESSIONAL REGISTER 429 (Book on 
Demand Ltd. 2013) (Madison in the House of Representatives, June 8, 1789). 
 41.  See MASS. CONST. Part the First, art. 30 (1780) (”In the government of this 
Commonwealth, the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and judicial 
powers, or either of them: The executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, 
or either of them: The judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or 
either of them: to the end it may be a government of laws and not of men.”). 
 42.  MONTESQUIEU, supra note 35, at bk. 11, ch. 6. 
 43.  Id. at bk. 11, ch. 6, 183 (“The executive power . . . ought to have a share in the 
legislature by the power of rejecting, otherwise it would soon be stripped of its prerogative.”). 
 44.  Id. at bk. 11, ch. 6, 179. 
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A. Montesquieu’s Mistake 
The American Founders adopted a structure of government that 
replicated much of what Montesquieu had said about the English 
system. “All legislative Powers herein granted” were vested in a 
bicameral representative body,45 as Montesquieu had advocated.46 
And “[t]he executive Power” was vested in an individual, as 
Montesquieu had urged, with a president substituted for a monarch.47 
In Montesquieu’s words: “The executive power ought to be in the 
hands of a monarch, because this branch of government, having need 
of dispatch, is better administered by one than by many.”48 These 
institutional arrangements were adopted in expressly essentialist 
terms, as if differing kinds of power could cleanly be assigned into 
separate hands. Yet in claiming that they could be, and had been in 
England, Montesquieu was mistaken. 
What was really going on in the English system was not power 
separation, but power sharing. The monarch’s power to say no to 
legislation made him a third chamber of the legislature, with more 
voting clout than any other member of that body. He was the biggest 
legislator on the block, because he could trade his right to reject laws 
that other legislators wanted for their support of whatever laws he 
wanted.49 The same was true of the American President, thanks to his 
power to veto acts of Congress, which could be overridden only by a 
supermajority vote in each House.50 Meanwhile, Parliament’s power 
to vote no confidence in the monarch’s officials51 and the American 
Senate’s power to refuse consent to the President’s appointments in 
each case served an executive, managerial function, like that of a 
corporate board of directors.52 And the powers of Parliament and 
 
 45.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
 46.  MONTESQUIEU, supra note 35, at bk. 11, ch. 6, 176–79. 
 47.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
 48.  MONTESQUIEU, supra note 35, at bk. 11, ch. 6, 179. 
 49.  What eventually made that less true was the convention of responsible or cabinet 
government, which was only beginning to emerge at the time of Montesquieu’s visit (and which 
Montesquieu elliptically condemned as a mortal threat to liberty). See MONTESQUIEU, supra 
note 35, at bk. 11 ch. 6, 179. At that time, the monarch had refused assent as recently as 1996 is 
now, and the power to do so would likely have influenced the fate of many proposed laws that 
never passed in Parliament. Laurence Claus, Montesquieu’s Mistakes and the True Meaning of 
Separation, 25 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUDIES 419, 428 n.57 (2005). 
 50.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
 51.  See, e.g., ALBERT VENN DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 449–51 (10th ed. 1965) (first edition published 1885). 
 52.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
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Congress to impeach, try, convict, and remove officials were judicial.53 
These checks and balances were not preserving a primary separation 
of kinds of power. They were controverting that separation even as 
they served the very goal that separation was alleged to accomplish, 
namely, establishing a government of laws and not of men, a system 
that sustained political liberty by making the rule of law feel real. 
How were checks and balances achieving that result? Not by 
hermetically sealing essentially different kinds of power in separate 
institutional silos, but by ensuring that no individual participant in the 
system could conclusively determine the reach of her own powers. 
The virtue of “separation of powers” lies not in separating powers 
but in multiplying minds who must concur before government 
intrudes into the lives of its people, and adding others who review ex 
post the rightness of what those in government have done.54 How 
those minds are labeled is substantively beside the point; having the 
people who decide whether to prosecute be different from the people 
who adjudicate that prosecution is a deeply valuable institutional 
feature, but so, a fortiori, is having both of those decisionmakers differ, 
in any given instance, from others in government (however labeled) 
who might deserve to be prosecuted and convicted for wrongful acts. 
Why did Montesquieu not see this? Why his contagious fixation 
on separating kinds of power? Because he was grappling with how to 
explain the English system’s success when that system seemed to 
violate a cardinal principle of Enlightenment orthodoxy: sovereignty 
was supposed to be indivisible. So had said Montesquieu’s famous 
French predecessor, Jean Bodin.55 Montesquieu had two copies56 of 
Les Six Livres de la République, first published in 1576, which 
emphasized the point. The indivisibility of sovereignty was affirmed in 
the scholarship of Johannes Althusius,57 Hugo Grotius,58 Thomas 
 
 53.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; see WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDSWORTH, 1 A HISTORY OF 
ENGLISH LAW 379–385 (3d ed. 1922) (on the English history of impeachment). 
 54.  “[T]he more minds that must concur in the constitutionality and virtue of a proposed 
exercise of power, the more likely that exercise is to be constitutional and virtuous.” Claus, 
supra note 49, at 425. Cf. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA: HOW MANY MINDS PRODUCE 
KNOWLEDGE (2006); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, A CONSTITUTION OF MANY MINDS (2009); Adrian 
Vermeule, Many-Minds Arguments in Legal Theory, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1 (2009). 
 55.  See JEAN BODIN, SIX BOOKS OF THE COMMONWEALTH 52–55 (M.J. Tooley trans., 
Basil Blackwell Oxford 1955) (1576) (“[S]overeignty is, of its very nature, indivisible . . . .”). 
 56.  ROBERT SHACKLETON, MONTESQUIEU: A CRITICAL BIOGRAPHY 306−07 (1st ed. 
1961). 
 57.  See generally JOHANNES ALTHUSIUS, POLITICA METHODICE DIGESTA (Frederick 
Carney ed., Liberty Fund, Inc. 1995) (1603). 
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Hobbes,59 Ludolph Hugo60 and Samuel von Pufendorf.61 It underlay 
Pufendorf’s claim that the Habsburg Holy Roman Empire was an 
“irregular,” unsustainable system of government because it purported 
to divide sovereignty between the emperor and the German princes.62 
In the separation of powers, Montesquieu identified a way to 
reconcile the indivisibility of sovereignty with the success and 
sustainability of the English system.63 Sovereign powers could be 
separated from one another, so long as the ultimate exercise of each 
kind of power was undivided.64 One ultimate lawgiver could supply a 
coherent body of law even though that lawgiver was separated from 
those who would implement that law.65 One chief executive could 
keep government nimble and consistent in bringing the law into 
people’s lives. But in Montesquieu’s eyes, the sustainability of dividing 
power depended on the separated powers differing in kind.66 
The Philadelphia Convention’s attempt to divide legislative power 
between the new nation and existing state governments violated 
 
 58.  See generally HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS, bk. I, ch. 3 § 7 (Knud 
Haakon ed., Liberty Fund, Inc. 2005) (1625). 
 59.  THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN ch. 18, para. 16 (Oxford: University Press 1965) (1651) 
(noting that “the rights, which make the essence of sovereignty . . . are incommunicable and 
inseparable”). 
 60.  See generally LUDOLPH HUGO, DE STATU REGIONUM GERMANIAE (Helmstedt, 
University of Helmstedt 1661). 
 61.  See generally SAMUEL VON PUFENDORF, INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF THE 
PRINCIPAL KINGDOMS AND STATES OF EUROPE (Michael Seidler ed., Liberty Fund, Inc. 2013) 
(8th ed, 1719). 
 62.  Id. at 282. 
Its irregular Constitution of Government is one of the chief Causes of its Infirmity; it 
being neither one entire Kingdom, neither properly a Confederacy, but participating 
of both kinds: For the Emperour has not the entire Soveraignty over the whole 
Empire, nor each Prince in particular over his Territories; and tho’ the former is more 
than a bare Administrator, yet the latter have a greater share in the Soveraignty than 
can be attributed to any Subjects or Citizens whatever, tho’ never so great. 
Id. Pufendorf drew an analogy to a building designed in disregard of the “Rules of 
Architecture” or which had suffered from “some great Fault” that had “been cur’d and made up 
after a strange and unseemly manner.” SAMUEL VON PUFENDORF, OF THE LAW OF NATURE 
AND NATIONS: EIGHT BOOKS IN 1 VOLUME 679 (4th ed., The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 2005) 
(4th ed. 1729). 
 63.  Montesquieu condemned only insufficiently nuanced theories of indivisibility. See 
Robert Shackleton, Montesquieu, Bolingbroke, and the Separation of Powers, 3 FRENCH STUD. 
25, 26 (1949). 
 64.  See id. at 26 (“If the three powers are rigidly separated, the constitution can be said to 
promote liberty.”). 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  See id. at 28 (“[L]iberty can be secured only by dividing political authority . . . into its 
three constituent functions, and by assigning these functions to different bodies or 
individuals . . . .”). 
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Montesquieu’s nuanced vision of how sovereign power could durably 
be divided. Yet in constructing their national government, the 
American Founders followed Montesquieu’s lead. They did not just 
create differently configured institutions to perform distinguishable 
institutional tasks. They chose to characterize the respective powers of 
the institutions they created as different in kind. Perhaps some 
ambivalence about this choice, some recognition that it was deeply in 
tension with the checks and balances that they had expressly created, 
prompted the first Congress not to pass Madison’s proposed 
“separation of powers” amendment. Yet Montesquieu’s premise 
about the character of sovereignty may still help explain their choice 
to invest “the executive Power” in one person. 
B. The Impossible Separation 
There are two deep difficulties with seeing separation of kinds of 
power as a source of liberty and the rule of law. First, we can all see 
that lawmaking and law-executing both happen inside each branch of 
the United States Government. Each executes existing law (including 
the law of the Constitution) when acting, and each acts in ways that 
both make and apply law. If we were to quantify the volume of law 
made by each branch, we would have to acknowledge that the largest 
lawmaker is the so-called Executive, followed by the so-called 
Judiciary, with Congress bringing up the rear. And we can see that 
what is so probably has to be so. Applying the words of existing law 
often requires elaboration, requires adding to the words that count, 
that guide law’s community going forward. How else can law fulfill its 
function of “stabilizing expectations,”67 of enabling our shared 
understanding of how we are to live together? Even Justice Scalia 
conceded that “a certain degree of discretion, and thus of lawmaking, 
inheres in most executive or judicial action, and it is up to Congress, 
by the relative specificity or generality of its statutory commands, to 
determine—up to a point—how small or how large that degree shall 
be.”68 
Second, in any human community, there is only one kind of human 
action that distinctively deserves to be called governing, and that is 
lawmaking, issuing words that guide conduct and shape expectation. 
We all do law applying, at least to ourselves. Our so-called “private” 
 
 67.  See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A 
DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 201 (William H. Rehg trans., MIT Press 1996). 
 68.  Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 417 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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institutions apply law to us as much as our “public” ones do. Just 
compare the complex miscellany of laws that a “private” university or 
a “private” bank applies in its relations with us to the much smaller 
set that are applied by the DMV. And dispute resolving is often done 
by “private” persons too. A leading consideration in our choice to call 
only some of our law-applying institutions “governmental” is the 
extent to which those institutions engage in lawmaking for our wider 
community (not just for their own internal lives) and so help govern 
our community. Hence the complaint that private arbitration robs the 
community of valuable precedent, of added law.69 In that sense, then, 
there are not really three kinds of power, just one—the ability through 
one’s words to affect what others in one’s community will likely do 
and expect.70 That one kind of power can be distributed among three 
branches, or six, or twelve, or however many more we decide 
optimally achieves the goals we set for government, both in helping us 
do things together and in protecting us from one another. 
Notice that all three branches of the United States Government 
can issue orders in the exercise of power that existing law delegates to 
them.71 We can recognize those orders as exercises of power 
particularly when they are not rote applications of existing law, but 
exercises of judgment about what order to issue within a zone of 
discretion. And those orders are obviously instances of lawmaking 
when Congress passes statutes and courts issue opinionated 
judgments and executives issue regulations. But each branch is also 
capable of issuing orders to particular persons without adding to the 
words that guide later conduct of others; we could say that such 
person-specific orders are virtual laws for their recipients but do not 
add to the laws of the wider community, do not add to the words that 
 
 69.  See, e.g., Ank Santens & Romain Zamour, Dreaded Dearth of Precedent in the Wake of 
International Arbitration - Could the Cause also Bring the Cure?, 7 Y.B. ARB. & MEDIATION 73, 
82 (2015) (“Beverley McLachlin, the former Chief Justice of Canada, with specific reference to 
the construction industry, warns: ‘court decisions, over the years, build up a settled legal 
framework against which contracts can be drawn and disputes settled, whatever the forum.’ 
Talking of ADR, she asserts in a striking metaphor: ‘The living tree of the law finds little 
nourishment in such arid soil. The age-old fruits of the law – helping people predict the 
probable outcomes of their actions and to modify their behavior intelligently – do not grow.’”) 
(quoting Beverley McLachlin, Judging the “Vanishing Trial” in the Construction Industry, 2 
FAULKNER L. REV. 315, 321, 322 (2011)). 
 70.  See generally LAURENCE CLAUS, LAW’S EVOLUTION AND HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, 
ch. 7 (2012). 
 71.  See, e.g., Chevron v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (discussing 
Congressional ability to delegate power to the Executive Branch and the Court’s task of 
construing those delegations). 
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guide our group’s future life together. For example, Congress can 
issue one-off declarations of war and authorizations of force that 
effectively order the President to fight,72 courts can issue unreported 
judgments, with or without unpublished opinions, that order particular 
parties to comply,73 and executives can order individual persons to 
behave in all manner of ways (“step out of the car, please”), without 
creating law that guides others’ conduct on future occasions. In each 
of these instances, the one-off order, though it does not add words to 
the law of its community, does operate like a law for its recipient on 
the occasion of its issuance. On those occasions, the person issuing the 
order participates in a kind of micro-lawgiving that we recognize as an 
exercise of power, in a way that our daily rote application of existing 
law is not. Calling the three branches legislative, executive, and 
judicial does not help illuminate the commonality in character of 
these one-off actions, and their distinction from the transparently 
lawmaking actions that all three branches do too. 
Separating power, then, is nothing other than involving more 
minds in leadership, distributing the ability to affect other’s lives 
through lawmaking and other law-like order issuing. It is this sharing 
of power that holds the best prospect of reducing the risk that law’s 
letting us live together will also let us mistreat one another. This 
accomplishment comes, when it does, through the way power sharing 
prevents any one of us from conclusively determining the reach of our 
own powers. In other words, the accomplishment of political liberty 
and a rule of law comes through checks and balances. Those checks 
and balances may be participatory, requiring that more than one of us 
concur before action can be done, or expository, requiring that our 
scope for action be defined and policed by others, ex ante or ex post. 
When we see that promoting liberty and the rule of law is all 
about checks and balances, we can see that intra-institutional checks 
and balances matter as much as inter-institutional ones. Our legal 
system has always implicitly acknowledged this in its provision for its 
hierarchically highest lawmaking body to be multi-member and multi-
chamber, and for its ultimate dispute resolvers to sit as multi-member 
benches. Intra-institutional checking and balancing does not cease to 
 
 72.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (“Congress shall have power to . . . declare War.”). 
 73.  See, e.g., William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, The Non-Precedential 
Precedent—Limited Publication and No-Citation Rules in the United States Court of Appeals, 78 
COLUM. L. REV. 1168, 1174 (1978) (“A key characteristic of decisions without opinions is their 
failure to provide the parties or the court below with any hint as to the court’s reasoning.”). 
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be valuable when we reach the executive, but the Founders 
acknowledged Montesquieu’s efficiency point that executives might 
need to make quick decisions in day-to-day administration.74 As 
others have recognized, that efficiency concern was mostly met just by 
the Philadelphia Convention’s choice to provide for one chief 
executive rather than an executive board collectively deciding how to 
govern day to day.75 Having a single chief executive make many major 
time-sensitive decisions was a sensible concession to efficiency, but 
did not settle whether some decisions would best be shifted from that 
single chief executive to other individual officials or groups of officials 
and made by those officials independently of the chief executive. That 
dividing of the executive may add intra-institutional checks and 
balances, as it does when it brings independent prosecutorial scrutiny 
to executive action through a separated Attorney General. And 
dividing the executive may also enhance the effectiveness of the 
Constitution’s existing inter-institutional checks on the executive, both 
by delineating more precisely who within the executive should be 
held accountable for particular action, and by supplying support from 
within the executive for Congressional or judicial action against other 
elements of the executive. 
IV. WHEN AND HOW TO SEPARATE 
Having noticed the incoherence and impossibility of separating 
power by kind, is there any comparable conceptual or practical 
problem with trying to separate executive decision making by subject 
matter? There is not, because the decisions are distinguished from one 
another by the institutional relations among persons that those 
decisions involve. It is easy to distinguish and separate decisions to 
deploy the army from decisions to prosecute—they are as readily 
separable as any items on a human person’s to-do list can be. It is 
perfectly plausible to give one executive ultimate judgment on 
military deployment and another ultimate judgment on interest rate 
policy and another ultimate judgment on prosecutions, and to insulate 
them from one another. In contrast, lawmaking and law implementing 
 
 74. See THE FEDERALIST, NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton), in 16 THE DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 398–99 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds. 
2009), http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/RNCN-02-19-02-0002-007. 
 75.  See Berry & Gersen, supra note 1, at 1402 (“The most prominent critiques of the plural 
executive model target schemes in which several executives act in consort with overlapping 
authority. Such schemes may well produce government dysfunction, unaccountability, or trend 
towards tyranny, but the unbundled executive does not.”). 
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are often inextricably intertwined in particular governing actions. A 
divided executive is conceptually and practically possible. 
Is a divided executive desirable? American state constitutional 
experience suggests that it can be. Categorically assigning 
distinguishable executive decisions to different persons need not 
unduly impede the efficiency of government,76 and may even enhance 
it.77 Dividing the executive may make government more effective, for 
example, by more reliably bringing specialist expertise to decision 
making where that is valuable, or by reducing the potential for 
conflicts of interest to affect decision making. And quite aside from its 
effects on effectiveness, dividing the executive may better protect 
liberty and promote the rule of law, because it may enhance the 
Constitution’s existing system of checks and balances. 
There are two ways in which dividing the executive may 
contribute to the Constitution’s system of checks and balances. First, 
dividing the executive may add intra-institutional checks on executive 
officials. Well-designed checks and balances help keep us free and 
keep law real just as surely when those checks and balances operate 
inside institutions as when they operate between institutions. For 
example, a constitutionally independent Attorney General’s powers 
to investigate and prosecute wrongdoing are a constitutional check on 
other executive officials. We might argue that the American 
constitutional tradition has already drawn from England and 
established by long practice a convention that the Attorney General 
exercise her investigative and prosecutorial discretion independently, 
and that this already serves to check other executive officials. But 
such a convention does not check as reliably and effectively as it 
would if it were backed up by constitutional protection for the 
investigators and prosecutors. Making checks and balances reliable 
and effective is, after all, why we constitutionally protect our judges 
against executive retribution for their rulings. 
A second way in which dividing the executive may contribute to 
the Constitution’s system of checks and balances is by helping the 
Constitution’s existing inter-institutional checks and balances fulfill 
their function better. For example, the judiciary’s ability to enforce 
the criminal law against executive officials depends on prosecutorial 
initiative to bring cases to court. And Congress’s impeachment power 
 
 76.  See generally Marshall, supra note 2. 
 77.  See generally Berry & Gersen, supra note 1. 
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can serve as a more effective deterrent against and remedy for 
maladministration if responsibility for particular administrative 
actions is clearly demarcated and not allowed to hide under a unitary 
executive umbrella. Impeachment is further facilitated as a check on 
the executive if the evidence that establishes grounds for its exercise 
is forthcoming from an independent source within the executive. 
If we value political liberty and the rule of law, and recognize them 
to be our reasons for wanting a “separation of powers,” then we have 
reason to divide the executive in at least one way, namely, to separate 
the power to prosecute and litigate from presidential control. We have 
reason to make prosecuting and litigating wrongdoing a 
constitutionally protected intra-institutional check on executive 
government. The Constitution’s existing checks and balances are not 
up to the task of protecting against presidential abuse of those 
powers. For two centuries we have watched the power of the 
American Presidency grow. If the President can control those who 
decide whether to prosecute or sue for violations of American law, 
then the only constitutional protection against abuse of that control 
during a presidential term is the crude and inadequate instrument of 
presidential impeachment. That instrument is crude and inadequate 
because whether members of Congress choose to use it will depend 
on many factors other than whether the discretion to prosecute or 
litigate is in fact being abused. In deciding whether to impeach a 
President, members of Congress face a host of potential consequences 
that might outweigh the value of preventing perversions of justice. If 
the nation faces crises at home or abroad that pose risks of military 
conflict or economic calamity, members of Congress may judge that 
impeachment poses too much danger of destabilizing national 
leadership at a time when that leadership needs continuity to stay 
focused on the big picture. Members of Congress will also be 
influenced by their overall assessments of the person who would step 
into the Presidency in the event of successful impeachment, and 
whether they would be replacing someone they see is bad with 
someone they suspect is worse. In making those judgments, members 
of Congress will also be thinking about the effects of their decision-
making upon their own vocational prospects, mostly mediated 
through impacts of Congress members’ actions on the electoral 
prospects of the factions to which they belong. The pessimistic 
premise of pervasive careerist self-service by participants in political 
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systems has been vindicated often enough in human history to 
deserve our attention when we are crafting checks and balances. 
Separating the power to prosecute and litigate from the 
Presidency much improves the odds of keeping its exercise pure, by 
letting Congress supervise that exercise surgically. None of the factors 
that may well inhibit Congress from impeaching a President for abuse 
of the discretion to prosecute or litigate are likely to inhibit Congress 
from removing for cause an independent Attorney General who 
abuses such discretion. A President is needed for many crucial classes 
of decision, whereas an Attorney General is needed for just one. The 
identity of a President’s successor will usually be out of Congress’s 
hands, whereas the Senate can exercise quality control over who will 
be the next Attorney General. And members of Congress are far 
more likely to see a connection between a President’s career 
prospects and their own than they are to see their fates tied to that of 
an Attorney General. Abuse of discretion by a constitutionally 
independent Attorney General is, ceteris paribus, more likely to result 
in Congressional removal of that Attorney General than abuse of 
such discretion by order of a controlling President is to result in 
Congressional removal of that President. And that fact, along with the 
Senate confirmation required for her appointment, increases the 
likelihood that a constitutionally independent Attorney General will 
do the job well. Competent assistance from a constitutionally 
independent Attorney General will, in turn, help build the case on any 
occasion when executive maladministration does call for exercise of 
Congress’s impeachment power. 
The Constitution seems to nod in the direction of a divided 
executive when it lets Congress impeach any civil officer, not just the 
President.78 A truly monolithic vision of the executive would focus 
accountability at the top and leave the removal of underlings to the 
accountable chief executive. Recognizing that it is good constitutional 
policy to let Congress hold other executive decision makers directly 
accountable points to the potential independence of their decision 
making. It would harmonize with the impeachment aspect of the 
constitutional scheme for the Constitution to insulate, or to let 
Congress insulate, some of those other executive decision makers 
from presidential control. OLC’s conclusion that the President’s duty 
to take care that the laws be faithfully executed makes the President 
 
 78.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. 
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accountable for the Attorney General’s actions is at odds with the 
Constitution’s provision for Congress to hold the Attorney General 
directly accountable and to impeach and remove the Attorney 
General for misconduct without necessarily going after the President 
too. And the President’s power to grant reprieves and pardons79 for 
offenses prosecuted under her own administration as surely as for 
those prosecuted under previous administrations fits well with 
presidential separation from decisions to prosecute. 
The Constitution’s provision for only inter-institutional checks on 
the President need not be irrebuttably presumed to establish an 
optimal and unalterable accommodation of liberty and efficiency 
interests; rather, those checks could be recognized as minimum 
requirements, subject to supplementation by the multi-member multi-
chamber Congress with further devices to check the President more. 
Separate election of the President helps prevent a faction leader in 
the legislature from becoming substantive prime minister by 
controlling the appointment of executive officials. The President’s 
direct mandate contrasts with the British monarch’s lack thereof, and 
creates a separate power center in the system. But ultimately all of the 
institutions of government comprise persons checking and balancing 
one another, inside institutions as much as among them, and the 
Presidency as a power center poses a uniquely great danger to liberty 
in lacking intra-institutional checks, because it comprises only one 
person. This strengthens the case for letting the co-equal, multi-person 
branches add checks and balances, including by dividing the executive 
by reference to discrete decision making responsibilities for which 
there are real public policy reasons to favor independent decision 
making. We have express constitutional limitations on power, and 
checks and balances to help uphold those limitations, precisely 
because our choice of leaders is always an all-things-considered, 
holistic judgment made with limited options; we may decide that a 
candidate is the best on offer even though we cannot trust him to 
govern well in all respects. Constitutional limitations and checks and 
balances are the way we try to maximize our overall odds of being 
governed well. 
It was quite right of eighteenth century jurists to recognize the 
judicial and executive aspects of what both prosecutors and judges 
were doing, and reasonable to see both prosecutors and professional 
 
 79.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
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judges as part of the executive.80 What made the eighteenth century’s 
conception of separation of powers lively and valuable was its 
departing from notions of indivisible sovereignty and its opening up 
the world of checks and balances as the true source of liberty and the 
rule of law. Along with explicitly insulating the Attorney General 
from presidential control, a constitutional amendment could resolve 
the current text’s ambiguity in favor of allowing further Congressional 
supplementation of inter- and intra-institutional checks and balances. 
But regardless of whether Congress is given such capacity to 
redistribute power, there is a robust case for a direct constitutional 
division of the executive to establish an independent Attorney 
General. 
An independent Attorney General and Department of Justice is 
likely to prove a better vehicle for investigating government action, 
including presidential conduct, than is the makeshift mechanism of ad 
hoc appointed independent investigators. That is so even if we posit 
that those independent investigators are comparably protected from 
unjustified dismissal.81 An independent counsel hired to pursue 
specific investigations may be at risk of seeing success in the role as 
dependent on finding something, on identifying and proving 
wrongdoing, and this may put a psychological thumb on the scale for 
pursuing an investigation further than truly serves the interests of 
justice. An independent Attorney General is less at risk of this, 
because no particular investigation is her raison d’etre. She is an 
unambiguous success if she upholds law and justice, whatever that 
requires. 
V. THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT 
What is the optimal form for a separated office of the Attorney 
General? Most states separately elect theirs.82 This creates a greater 
danger of unconstructive checking. Partisan sniping and obstruction 
might escalate amid the high stakes of national politics enough to 
undermine effective governing. A separately elected Attorney 
General might be hostile to the President to a degree that actually 
compromises the Attorney General’s standing as an impartial 
 
 80.  See Claus, supra note 49, at 422−23. 
 81.  Cf. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (upholding legislation that let the Attorney 
General remove an independent counsel only for “good cause”). 
 82.  See Marshall, supra note 2, at 2452 (“As a result of this trend, at present, forty-three 
state attorneys general are elected and forty-eight are free from gubernatorial control.”). 
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upholder of the law. William Marshall offers grounds for optimism 
based on state government experience, but notes that “the powers of 
the Federal Attorney General are far greater, particularly in her 
centralized authority over criminal matters, than in any of the State 
Attorney General offices because, in most states, prosecutorial 
authority is localized and not under attorney general control.”83 
In the particular case of the national Attorney General and her 
senior subordinates in the Department of Justice, we might conclude 
that the Constitution’s current provision for presidential appointment 
subject to Senate confirmation is best. Having an Attorney General 
who was acceptable to the President ex ante could be optimal for 
constructive governance, provided that the Attorney General cannot 
be removed by the President for doing the job right. There is a case 
for requiring that the President choose the Attorney General, just as 
there is a case for letting the President choose judges rather than 
electing them. Protecting independence does not require separate 
selection, it just requires job security. 
What form should that security take? Congress already has power 
to impeach and remove the Attorney General, as a civil officer of the 
United States within the meaning of Article II § 4. Insulating the 
Attorney General from presidential removal would afford the 
requisite independence, but the reach of the role arguably calls for a 
way to hold the incumbent accountable for poor performance, not just 
outright wrongdoing. At the Philadelphia Convention, the Founders 
debated whether to emulate the English Act of Settlement’s provision 
for removal of judges on address of both Houses. James Wilson 
opined that “[t]he Judges would be in a bad situation if made to 
depend on every gust of faction which might prevail in the two 
branches of our Govt.” and the Convention decided against the 
legislative address mechanism for removal.84 Such a mechanism might 
work well, however, to police the tenure of an Attorney General, and 
Wilson’s factionalism concern could be met by setting the threshold 
for a vote to remove at two-thirds, borrowing from the 25th 
Amendment’s provision for Congressional confirmation of 
presidential inability. 
 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 429 (Max Farrand ed., 
1911). 
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Amending the Constitution to create this independent office is a 
step that could, under Article V, be triggered and accomplished by 
representatives of the 48 states that have already chosen to establish 
their own independent Attorneys General.85 
VI. FURTHER FUTURE CHANGES 
When we apportion power, whether inter- or intra-institutionally, 
we should ask not whether our institutional configurations separate 
powers, but whether they situate people in ways that promote good 
government. Good government may call for separating the power of 
one person from the power of another by reference to the relations 
among persons that their respective exercises of power will involve. 
We can readily distinguish prosecuting from judging from declaring 
war simply by the differing configuration of human relations that each 
distinctively involves. The separation of powers is coherently 
relational among persons. 
In too many of its decisions, ranging from Humphrey’s Executor v. 
United States86 to INS v. Chadha,87 the Supreme Court has clung to 
characterizing governing actions as executive, legislative, or judicial 
when in truth those actions were chameleons that could be 
characterized in more than one of those ways. That characterizing was 
not a coherent basis for drawing distinctions and allocating power the 
way the Court did, allowing and disallowing as it did. In the process, 
the Court has too often lost sight of what the separation of powers 
exists to accomplish. Constitutional reform could, in recognition of 
this, go beyond creating an independent Attorney General, and give 
Congress power to divide the executive further, such as by identifying 
other categories of decision making (for example, interest rate 
policy88) that would optimally be assigned to independent persons and 
providing for those persons’ true independence from presidential 
control or removal. 
Constitutional reform could also give Congress more tools to 
supervise the executive. Reform could restore a one-House veto over 
 
 85.  See Marshall, supra note 2, at 2452. 
 86.  295 U.S. 602 (1935). 
 87.  462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
 88.  The Federal Reserve Act § 10 conforms to the Humphrey’s Executor principle in 
providing that Federal Reserve Board members may be removed by the President during their 
terms, albeit only for cause. See 12 U.S.C. § 242 (2010) (“[A]nd thereafter each member shall 
hold office for a term of fourteen years from the expiration of the term of his predecessor, 
unless removed sooner for cause by the President.”) (emphasis added). 
CLAUS ALMOST READY FOR ISSUE (DO NOT DELETE) 5/17/2018  4:44 PM 
48 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 13:2 
executive lawmaking, nullifying the conceptually confused Chadha 
decision on the constitutionally compelling ground that as it takes 
concurrence of two Houses plus the President to make the higher law 
we call statutes, any of those three institutions should be able to say 
no to lesser, supposedly derivative laws that come out of the 
executive. Once we recognize that the executive makes law without 
bicameralism and presentment, we can see that a one-House veto 
actually protects the principle of bicameralism and presentment by 
preventing the executive from making law that could not pass 
Congress with bicameralism and presentment.89 This article’s 
proposals for dividing the executive may, of course, enable executive 
lawmaking that is immune to presidential veto; discrete instances of 
this may be justified by the same principles truly underlying 
separation of powers theory that support the power of a sufficiently 
united Congress to override presidential vetoes.90 Sometimes effective 
government depends on decision making by a sole chief executive, but 
often it does not, and as this article has elaborated, liberty and the 
rule of law may be better served by letting other minds prevail. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The national Attorney General’s current constitutional status is a 
loose thread that, when pulled upon, unravels the whole tapestry of 
essentialist separation of powers. For the reasons that this article has 
elaborated, separating kinds of power is neither possible nor 
desirable. Checks and balances among those who govern are what 
truly serve the interests that separation of powers theory emerged to 
protect. Well-designed checks and balances promote liberty and the 
rule of law as surely when those checks and balances operate inside 
institutions as when they operate between institutions. If we can 
identify categories of executive decision-making that would better be 
made discretely by discrete persons, whether because doing so 
introduces an additional check on other executive actors or because 
the decisions are best made with specialist expertise or because their 
segregation reduces risks of conflicts of interest or for a combination 
of reasons that may include these and others, then separation of 
powers theory should not be thought to stand in our way. We should 
 
 89.  “Absent the veto, the agencies receiving delegations of legislative or quasi-legislative 
power may issue regulations having the force of law without bicameral approval and without the 
President’s signature.” Chadha, 462 U.S. at 986−87 (1983) (White, J., dissenting). 
 90.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3. 
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make those persons independent of the chief executive, rather than 
reposing all ultimate responsibility in an omnibus CEO. 
As this article has explained, dividing the executive may add 
valuable intra-institutional checks and balances, as it does when an 
independent Attorney General polices the conduct of her executive 
counterparts. Dividing the executive may also enhance the value of 
the Constitution’s existing inter-institutional checks on the executive. 
Congress’s power of impeachment would better protect liberty and 
the rule of law if it were complemented by intra-institutional 
separations of power within the so-called executive branch of 
government, including provision for a constitutionally independent 
chief prosecutor and litigator. Insulating the Attorney General from 
the President fits with the Constitution’s empowering Congress to 
remove the Attorney General, not just the President, and makes 
Congress’s power to remove executive officials more effective as a 
check on the executive. Congress’s power to remove executive 
officials better serves to deter and punish bad behavior where it can 
be used surgically, rather than as a shotgun blast against a whole 
administration. Failure to do one aspect of administration right is less 
likely to occasion a responsible President’s downfall than it would be 
to bring down a responsible separated official. There are more likely 
to be strong countervailing considerations against removing a 
President, such as other areas of presidential decision-making that 
Congress does not wish to unsettle, linked electoral fortunes of a 
President and members of Congress, or just plain dislike of the Vice 
President. An independent Attorney General can in turn serve as a 
resource to Congress in building the case for impeachment of other 
executive officials, including the President, when such cases deserve to 
be built. 
Even in England, from which the office of Attorney General came 
and where separation of powers has never been a governing principle, 
reform of the office to enhance its independence has recently been 
considered.91 Changing the United States Constitution to establish an 
independent Attorney General could be a pivotal step in a process of 
 
 91.  See SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, REFORM OF THE OFFICE OF 
ATTORNEY GENERAL, 2008, HL 93, available at https://publications.parliament.uk/pa 
/ld200708/ldselect/ldconst/93/93.pdf; CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, FIFTH REPORT, 
2007, HC 306, available at https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmconst 
/306/30602.htm. 
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constitutional reform that more fully realizes America’s commitment 
to liberty and the rule of law. 
